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Jane Bailey*

Towards an Equality-Enhancing Conception.
of Privacy

Canadian jurisprudence has explicitly recognized the impact of child
pornography on the privacy rights of the children abused in its production. In
contrast, it has generally not analyzed other forms of harmful expression, such
as hate propaganda and obscenity, to be violations of the privacy rights of those
targeted. In a previous article, the author suggested that this distinction in the
jurisprudence reflected the relative ease with which the privacy interests of the
individual children whose abuse is documented in child pornography meshed with
the prevalent Western approach to privacy as a negative individual liberty against
intrusion. Noting the historic role that the individualistic conception of privacy
has played in perpetuating inequality, the author suggests that reliance on the
prevailing paradigm is unlikely to prove useful in advancing the lived substantive
equality of those targeted by hate, child pornography and obscenity However,
before the advancement of privacy claims by targeted members of equalityseeking communities is abandoned, the potential for revising the paradigmatic
Western account of privacy should be explored. The author invokes the alternative
accounts ofprivacy developed by Oscar Gandy, Priscilla Regan, and Julie Cohen,
Who analyze the implications of widespread digital data collection, aggregation,
and social profiling. Their work may provide ways of fashioning an account of
privacy intrinsically tied to producing substantive equality for groups targeted by
and in hate propaganda, obscenity and child pornography, one which may also
assist equality-seeking groups more generally.
La jurisprudence .canadienne a explicitement reconnu I'incidence de la
pornographie juvenile sur le respect de la vie privee des enfants exploites pour
sa production. Par contre, la m6me jurisprudence n'a pas analys6 d'autres formes
nefastes d'expression, par exemple la propagande haineuse et lobscenit6, en
tant que violations du droit i la vie privee des personnes qui en sont la cible.
Dans un article precedent, I'auteure avance que cette distinction dans la
jurisprudence reflte la facilit6 relative avec laquelle les droits j la vie priv6e des
enfants dont I'exploitation est bien illustree dans la pornographie juvenile a 6t6
assimilee J la conception de vie privse qui pr6vaut en Occident, soit une libert6
individuelle negative, une liberte contre l'intrusion. Relevant le r6le historique
jou6 par la conception individualiste du respect de la vie priv6e pour ce qui est
de perpdtuer Iin6galite, I'auteure avance qu'il est peu probable que le fait de se
fier au paradigme pr6dominant soit utile pour faire avancer l'6galit6 veritable,
dans leur vie quotidienne, des personnes ciblees par la haine, la pornographie
juvenile et l'obscenit6. Toutefois, avant que ne soit abandonn6e la lutte pour
le respect de la vie priv6e men6e par les membres cibl6s des communaut6s
revendicatrices du droit I I'6galit6, il y aurait lieu d'examiner la possibilitd de
revoir la notion occidentale paradigmatique de vie priv6e. Lauteure cite les
travaux portant sur la vie priv6e 6labords par Oscar Gandy, Priscilla Regan et Julie
Cohen, ces derniers ayant analys6 les incidences des pratiques g6n6ralis6es de
collecte de donn~es num6riques, de recoupement des donnees et de profilage
social. Leurs travaux peuvent sugg6rer des fagons d'6laborer une description
de la vie privee qui serait intrins~quement lide 6 la realisation d'6galit6 veritable
pour les groupes cibl6s par la propagande haineuse, par lobscenit6 et par la
pornographie juv6nile, description qui constituerait aussi une aide plus generale
pour les groupes qui revendiquent 1'6galit6.
(Hons.) (Trent); M.I.R. (Queen's); LL.B. (Queen's); LL.M. (U. Toronto);
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law - Common Law Section, University of Ottawa. Thanks to
Louisa Garib, Bridget Mcllveen, Julie Shugarman, and Brad Jenkins for their wonderful research
and editorial assistance and for their ongoing sharing of ideas and insights. Thanks also to the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council for funding On the Identity Trail, a four-year research
project from which this paper derives. Finally, thank you to my good friend and colleague Ian Kerr
for his insights, support, and encouragement. All errors, of course, remain my own.
* Jane Bailey, B.A.S.

268

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Introduction
Development of the privacy paradigm
1. Privacy analysis in the Canadiancase law on hate propaganda,
obscenity, andchild pornography
2.
The individualisticparadigm
3.
Shaping individual targets' claims to fit the paradigmatic
mould
II. Pitfalls of the individualisticparadigmfor equality-seekinggroups
1. Privacy as an individualistic and atomistic right to control
access
2. Privacy as a negative right against the state
3.
Privacy as inalterablygenderedand raced
III. Towards an equality-enhancingconception ofprivacy
1. Collective perspectives on priva, v - Gandy, Regan, and Cohen
2. Advancing collectiveprivacyclaimsfor targets ofhate, obscenity,
andchildpornography
a. Identifying helpful strandsfrom Gandy, Regan, and Cohen
b. Confronting the limits of the analogy
Conclusion
I.

Introduction
It is only in the context of child pornography that Canadian courts have
explicitly recognized harmful expression as a violation of the privacy
rights of its targets. In contrast, in the contexts of hate propaganda and
obscenity, although Canadian legal decision-makers have referred to the
dignity interests of the groups targeted by these forms of expression, they
have not recognized them as privacy violations. This divergence does
not, I suggest, reflect the fact that privacy is not in play for the targets of
hate and obscenity, but rather that the case law adopts an unduly narrow
conception of privacy as an individual right against intrusion (particularly
by the state). Since the legal analysis of the harms of child pornography
focuses largely on its impact on individual children-both those abused in
its production and those who may be abused as the result of its messageprivacy, envisioned as an individual right. :ushes well with the analysis. In
contrast, the harms of hate propaganda and obscenity have predominantly
been cast as collective, group-based equality harms and therefore do not
mesh well with the current individualistic analysis of privacy.
Although certain individual targets of hate propaganda and
obscenity could arguably also craft arguments to assert claims within the
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individualistic paradigm, the historic shortcomings of such legal strategies
suggest that this is unlikely to be an equality-enhancing proposition for
socially disenfranchised groups and their members. Rather than re-shaping
what are fundamentally group-based claims to fit the individualistic
privacy paradigm, I suggest a re-visioning of the paradigm itself in a way
that better reflects privacy's social and collective values, as well as the
interdependence between the individual and the collective in the process
of identity formation.
Collective perspectives on privacy developing in the context of
concerns surrounding data management may be of some assistance in
building an equality-enhancing conception of privacy upon which the
groups targeted by hate, obscenity, and child pornography might draw.
A growing body of literature focuses on the privacy implications of the
escalating collection and aggregation of data about individuals that is being
facilitated by emerging communications technologies. That literature
may provide a useful analogy for thinking through both the individual
and collective privacy-related harms of hate propaganda, obscenity, and
child pornography. Of particular interest are the analyses within the
literature that focus on the aggregation of data collected from and about
individuals in order to produce group profiles later used by third parties
to make judgments about members of those groups. I suggest that strands
within this part of the literature that focus on the privacy harms of social
sorting through group profiling may assist both in conceptualizing the
collective privacy-related harms of hate propaganda, obscenity, and child
pornography, and in evaluating strategies for addressing them. Like many
of the authors dealing with data management, I suggest that intervention
at the data collection stage is likely to be a crucial aspect of any strategy
that seeks to minimize both discriminatory conduct and interference in
self-definition.
The analysis will proceed in three parts. Part I summarizes the way
in which privacy has been dealt with in Canadian case law on hate,
obscenity, and child pornography, which was dealt with in detail in a
paper published in the previous volume of this journal.' That summary
is then placed within the context of a broader negative, individualistic
conception of privacy pervading western legal and philosophical thought.
I then go on to show how the privacy claims of certain individual targets
of hate and obscenity could be fit within the confines of the individualized

1. Jane Bailey, "Missing Privacy Through Individuation: The Treatment of Privacy Law in the
Canadian Case Law on Hate, Obscenity, and Child Pornography" (2008) 31 Dal. L.J. 55.
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privacy paradigm, just as the claims of the individual children abused in
the production of child pornography have.
Notwithstanding that a feasible argument can be made to fit such
claims within the individualized paradigm, in Part II I suggest that it is
the mould itself that ought to be reconceptualized, rather than the claims
of targets. My suggestion stems from a brief analysis of some historic
examples of the pitfalls experienced by equality-seeking groups and their
members who have relied upon the individualistic paradigm in asserting
claims.
Part III explores some of the literature proposing alternative visions
of privacy that could prove useful in articulating an equality-enhancing
conception of that right for members of equality-seeking groups, for the
groups themselves, and for the larger community. The Conclusion notes
that both traditional, liberal approaches to privacy as negative liberty, as
well as more social, collective approaches to privacy are arguably at play
for target groups and their members, but suggests that the social approach
offers greater potential for developing a more robust equality-enhancing
conception of privacy and its related interests.
2
I. Development of the privacyparadigm
If one simply read Canadian case law on hate, obscenity, and child
pornography in order to determine the nature and value of privacy, one
would almost certainly conclude that it is primarily a control-overinformation mechanism designed to protect the individual from the state in
order to produce purely individual goods such as self-fulfillment, autonomy,
and liberty. While much of the literature on privacy also reflects these
themes, it also offers much richer and more diverse conceptualizations of
privacy, which are more likely to fit with the rights, interests and needs of
the members of equality-seeking groups than is the current individualistic
paradigm. Included within these more promising alternatives are those that
envision privacy as extending beyond control over information, as well as
those that articulate a vision of privacy as a producer of collective social
goods that transcend both the individual and individuals as an aggregate.

2.
It is important to note that the privacy "paradigm" referred to in this paper is specific to Western
culture and quite different from the approaches to privacy in other cultures. See, for example, Fadwa
El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy Resistance (New York: Berg, 1999).
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1. Privacy Analysis in the CanadianCase Law on Hate Propaganda,
Obscenity, and ChildPornography'
The Canadian case law on hate propaganda, obscenity, and child
pornography approaches privacy as an individual right against intrusion
in private spheres, with particular focus on intrusion by state agents. In all
three contexts, privacy is analyzed predominantly from the perspective of
those accused by the state of participating in hate propagation, obscenity,
or child pornography. From this vantage point, the emphasis on limiting
state intrusion on the sphere of the individual is understandable, as accused
persons challenge the ability of the state to limit expression outside of
the "public" realm, to conduct searches and seizures, and to require that
certain information about convicted offenders be placed in governmentmaintained databases.
On the other hand, the privacy rights of those targeted by these forms
of expression have only been explicitly recognized in the context of child
pornography. Numerous Canadian courts have reflected upon the invasion
of privacy experienced by children abused in the production of child
pornography as the result of the recording and repeated dissemination
of their abuse. Recognition of this individualistic conception of privacy
within this body of case law is unsurprising, given its focus on the harms
of child pornography to individual children, while paying little attention to
its broader harms to the collective equality and dignity interests of children
as a group.
In contrast, the case law on hate propaganda and obscenity focuses
on the more collective harms of these forms of expression, including in
relation to multiculturalism and equality. In this context, where the case law
does discuss the rights and interests of targeted groups and their members,
it does so by reference to dignity, autonomy, and equality-making no
direct mention of privacy rights.
It might be concluded that privacy interests are recognized in the
context of child pornography, but not in the contexts of hate and obscenity
because privacy interests do not arise in the latter two situations. However,
I suggest that the schism in the case law represents the incorporation of a
specific individualistic conception of privacy that, although it has become
paradigmatic in western legal and philosophical writing, need not be
accepted as complete.

3.
The summary provided in this section is premised upon the more detailed analysis undertaken in
the companion paper to this one, which was published in the previous volume of this journal.
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2. The IndividualisticParadigm
Much of the current Canadian legal approach to privacy conceptualizes it
as an aspect of the liberty to which thinkers such as John Stuart Mill argued
every individual is entitled.4 The concept of privacy fit well with Mill's
assertion that human liberty required drawing a line between individual
independence and social control-between a sphere of self-regarding
conduct within which one ought only to have to answer to oneself and
a. sphere of other-regarding conduct within which it was appropriate
for society to intervene in order to prevent recognizable harm to other
individuals.'
For Mill, the primary function of privacy was the development of the
individual as a thinking, independent, autonomous agent, rather than a
being controlled by convention. 6 Embedded in this account of privacy's
value are its intrinsic merit as the province of humanity and its functional
value in developing each person's faculties through being guaranteed a
certain unintruded-upon space within which to make decisions having no
effect on others.7 In this account, the intervention of society is characterized
as a serious intrusion on the rational and independent decision-making
powers of the individual; where the latter seems in every circumstance to
be preferable to the former.
This approach, grounded in the sanctity of the individual, the notion
of separable public and private spheres of activity, and production of
individual goods, was readily adopted by liberal legal thinkers. In 1890,
fully embracing an individual account of privacy that sought to separate
that which was properly made "public" from that which was properly
maintained as "private," Warren and Brandeis characterized privacy both
broadly and negatively:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing
to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right "to be let alone."
4.
Interestingly, Mill argued this not on the basis of individual rights but on the basis of social
utility-that utility for all would be maximized by according sufficient freedom to each individual to
self-determine what the good life would mean. Mill's approach was also a constrained one, though,
arguing as it did for recognition of harm to others as the limit on individual choice: John Stuart-Mill,
On Liberty, 4th ed. (London: Longman, Roberts and Green, 1869) online: Bartleby.com <http://www.
bartleby.com/ 130/index.html> c. I at 9-1I.
5.
Ibid. at 6-9.
6. Ibid. at 3.
7.
In this regard, Mill's account is extremely difficult to accept. The line between self-regarding
and other-regarding behaviour is excruciatingly difficult to draw and in an increasingly interactive,
interconnected world very unconvincing. As noted by Allen, "Purely self-regarding conduct is, indeed,
a myth": Anita Allen, Why Privacy isn't Everything: Feminist Reflections on PersonalAccountability
(New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) at 44 [Allen, 2003].
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Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that "what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."'
Interestingly, Warren and Brandeis were not focused on "private" in the
sense that government ought to be kept out, rather their concern was for
"private" as between individuals or individuals and groups within society.
In particular, they were concerned that the gossipy media ought to be reined
in so as to keep other individuals out of what they considered to be highly
personal aspects of the lives of society folks.9 They grounded the legal
claim to privacy on the adaptation of legal protections for property, arguing
the time was ripe to extend through common law a general individual right
of control over the extent to which incorporeal interests, such as thoughts,
feelings, and emotions were conveyed to others.' 0
The concept of privacy as control over access to information about
one's self has come to play a central role in law and theory since at least
1967 when Alan Westin defined privacy as:
The claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others. Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual
to social participation, privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal
of a person from the general society through physical or psychological
means, either in a state of solitude or small-group intimacy or, when
among larger groups, in a condition of anonymity or reserve."
Westin described individuals as being "continually engaged" in selfadjustment to balance the desire to withdraw from society against the
equally compelling desire for social participation (which he associated
with disclosure and communication). 2 His approach to privacy emphasized
the significance of control over information, not simply in relation to
individuals, but in relation to groups and institutions as well. Interestingly,
the latter assertion-the idea that privacy could and should be defined in

8.
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 [Warren
& Brandeis].
9.
Ibid. at 196. Apparently, the press had covered the social gatherings of Warren's wife in
embarrassing and humiliating detail, including particularly sensitive coverage of his daughter's
wedding: see Doe v. Methodist Hospital,690 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. 1997); 26 Media L. Rep. 1289 (Lexis),
a recent case before the Indiana Supreme Court.
10. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8 at 198.
11. Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967) at 7 [Westin, 1967].
12. Ibid.
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relation to claims by collectives has received comparatively little attention
from scholars, courts, and advocates.
References to collectives notwithstanding, it seems fair to say that
Westin's account of privacy's function is primarily an indiv dualistic one. 3
Privacy, he argued, is ultimately fundamental for creation ana naintenance
of a liberal democracy. 14 In explicating that claim, Westin . 'rted that
privacy serves to protect the sanctity of the individual "as a creature of
God" by assisting in the preservation of a core self of ultimate "secrets"
to which no one else is admitted, thus allowing the individual to maintain
his or her autonomy through an ability to control the gap between what
he or she understands of him or herself and what the world understands
him or her to be.' 5 More specifically, Westin asserted that privacy works
to provide individuals with personal autonomy, emotional release, selfevaluation, and limited and protected communication. 6
Dissatisfied with both the vagueness of privacy defined as the "right to
be let alone" 7 and the undue narrowness of the "control over information" 18
definition, scholars such as Ruth Gavison 9 and Anita Allen ° have pressed
for an understanding of privacy as a condition of inaccessibility of the

13. I say "primarily" here because, although the most-cited aspects of Westin's account of privacy
relate solely to promotion of individualism and social withdrawal, his account also encompassed social
goods of two sorts. Social goods such as better rested and more thoughtful social participants might
be characterized as derivatives of delivering privacy to individuals. Under this account, we protect
privacy to protect individual rights to autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited and
protected communication because these rights build better individuals, which in turn builds a better
society, where "better" connotes individuation. However, Westin's account also referred to privacy's
role in enabling and furthering plurality through collectives, the ultimate value of which extended
beyond their aggregate value to individual group members.
14. Westin, 1967, supra note II at 22 and 24.
15. Ibid.at33.
16. Ibid.at32-39.
17. With respect to the Warren & Brandeis definition, Anita Allen has said that under this definition,
"any form of offensive or harmful conduct directed toward another person could be characterized
as a violation of personal privacy." As a result, privacy in many cases would be indistinguishable
from intentional acts like assault, which at a practical and conceptual level are not convincingly
characterized as privacy violations: Anita Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacyfor Women in a FreeSociety
(New Jersey: Roman and Littlefield, 1988) at 7-8 [Allen, 1988]. Judith Jarvis Thomson, argued the
Warren & Brandeis formulation was also too narrow in that it could be taken to suggest that police
may watch you in your home using an x-ray device without interfering with your privacy because they
have not physically interfered with your "aloneness": Judith Jarvis Thomson, "The Right To Privacy"
(1975) 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs at 295.
18. Allen, 1988, supra note 17 at 8. Allen has also criticized the access control theory for allowing
for privacy to be defined according to how much privacy any individual chooses to have or to forego,
and also for failing to suggest parameters on how much control individuals ought to be accorded over
access to information about them: ibid. at 26.
19. Ruth Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 421 at 423.
20. Allen, 1988, supra note 17.
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person. Allen has suggested the following restricted-access account of
privacy:
[P]ersonal privacy is a condition of inaccessibility of the person, his
or her mental states, or information about the person to the senses or
surveillance devices of others. To say that a person possesses or enjoys
privacy is to say that, in some respect and to some extent, the person (or
the person's mental state, or information about the person) is beyond the
range of others' five senses and any devices that can enhance, reveal,
trace or record human conduct, thought, belief, or emotion.2
Further, she underscored the connection between the individual goods
deliverable by privacy and broader social benefits, as well as the intersubjective nature of identity formation:
We "know ourselves as separate only insofar as we live in connection
with others and ...we experience relationships only insofar as we
differentiate others from self." [reference omitted] Privacy signifies
contexts of self-determination. It signifies conditions in which the "I"
presupposed by "we" can be morally individuated, that is, in which
individuals can develop character, personality and skills. These traits can
enrich subjective experience and qualitatively enhance participation in
intimate relationships and group life.22
In short then, Allen argued that one of the values of privacy was the way
in which it functions to produce opportunities for self-definition and
personhood, which in turn make individuals fit for social participation and
contribution.23 A further derivative effect that she noted was promotion of
formal equality-equality of opportunity to contribute made possible by
providing women with meaningful opportunities for self-determination.
Although her account fundamentally urged the importance of privacy in
promoting "individuation" by ensuring each of us doesn't simply "merge
with the mass" by constantly having all aspects of ourselves subject to
public scrutiny, 4 it also drew attention to more collective moral imperatives
of social participation and contribution:

21. Ibid. at 15.
22. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women s Development
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), cited in Allen, 1988, supra note 17 at 48.
23. Allen, 1988, ibid. at 42.
24. Ibid.at 46.
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Not only the individuals extolled by liberals, but also the communities
extolled by communitarians
and socialists will benefit from opportunities
25
for personal privacy.
Notwithstanding references to collectives and social participation in the
privacy literature, the paradigmatic account of privacy both as individual
in nature and as a producer of individual goods predominates. As Colin
Bennett and Charles Raab have aptly summarized it:
The privacy paradigm rests on a conception of society as comprising
relatively autonomous individuals. It rests on an atomistic conception of
society; the community is no more than the sum total of the individuals
that make it up. Further, it rests on notions of differences between the
privacy claims and interests of different individuals. Individuals, with
their liberty, autonomy, rationality, and privacy, are assumed to know
their interests,
and should be allowed a private sphere untouched by
26
others.
3. Shaping individual targets 'claims to fit the paradigmaticmould
As discussed above in Part 1, the privacy rights of the individual children
directly targeted in the creation of child pornography have been legally
recognized. I will suggest that this reflects the shaping of these claims to
fit the paradigmatic individual privacy mould. Likewise, claims for certain
individuals targeted by hate propaganda and obscenity could also be shaped
to fit that mould, even though these kinds of claims are not reflected in the
case law. Ultimately, however, I will suggest that a reshaping of the mould,
rather than of the claims of equality-seeking groups and their members is
preferable in terms of promoting substantive equality.
The claims of children who are abused in the production of child
pornography can be made to fit neatly within the individualistic privacy
paradigm-although the privacy implications for those indirectly made
targets as a result can probably only be advanced under a more social
account of privacy. The individual children whose abuse is recorded in
child pornography have suffered both an interference with their "right
to be let alone" in a sphere traditionally considered to be highly private,
"sexual" activity, and have lost control over this personal information

25. Ibid. at 52. More recently, Allen has urged an even more balanced account of the individual and
social aspects of privacy in which the claim to privacy is not understood as a license for freedom from
social accountability within private spheres, saying "although privacy is important, accountability
is important too. Both in their own way render us more fit for valued forms of social participation.
Privacy is our repose and intimate accountability our engagement": Allen, 2003, supra note 7 at 6.
26. Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global

Perspective (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006) at 4 [Bennett & Raab].
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about themselves. Their dignity, independence, and autonomy are deeply
intervened upon by the abuse itself in a manner that is perpetuated by
the threat of the uncontrollable ongoing circulation of the record of their
abuse. Moreover, the potential notoriety associated with the imagery
might be argued an invasion of the anonymity that both Westin and Allen
characterized as one of the functions of privacy.. Presumed within this
framework is an absence of consent to the creation and distribution of the
record to others,27 premised in large part on an assumption of the absence of
consent to the sexually explicit representation or activity depicted.28 Under
this account, we might also argue that the autonomy of these children may
also be affected into adulthood due to the enduring public record of their
abuse.
In a circumstance where an individual is explicitly targeted by hate
propaganda, a privacy claim could be shaped to fit within the current
paradigm. Interference with the incorporeal interests of the individual
targeted in terms of their reputation could well be analyzed as an
interference with Warren and Brandeis's "right to be let alone." Assuming
they have not consented to be targeted,29 it might be argued that their rights
to anonymity and seclusion have been infringed 3°-not to mention their
ability to autonomously and independently self-define.
Privacy claims for the women featured in obscenity fit less easily
within the individualistic paradigm, in large part because of underlying
sexist presumptions about women's ongoing sexual availability to men.
Nonetheless, certain of these claims could be shaped to fit that mould.
Claims could be advanced similar to those of the children abused in child
pornography relating to the effect of the recording and production of
highly private aspects of their existence on their dignity, independence,
27. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 at 116, 118
[Sharpe] seems to have made this element clear by excepting from the criminal prohibitions those
consensual recordings of legal sexual activity between minors intended to be kept for their own
personal use.
28. It seems necessary to say "inlarge part" in the Canadian context, since the prohibitions on child
pornography relate to those 18 years of age and under, even though there is no legal presumption
against those 16 and over consenting to engage in sexual activity in certain contexts: Criminal Code
of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 ( 3 1 Supp.), s. I; 2005, c. 32, s. 2; 2008, c. 6, ss. 13, 54.
29. Consent or waiver in these circumstances might be argued to undermine a privacy claim where
the individual targeted has, for example, engaged in labelling him or herself using racist, sexist, or
homophobic language in an effort to reappropriate the terminology. New York has recently passed
regulations purportedly banning such conduct: "Things not to do when you're in New York" The
Ottawa Citizen (II March 2007) B6 (Proquest).
30. Here 1 draw upon Allen's analysis of sexual harassment, which she suggests constitutes an
invasion of the privacy of those targeted even where conducted in public space in that such harassment
undermines its target's ability to enjoy the freedom of movement and anonymity others may enjoy:
Allen, 1988 supra note 17 at 132.

278

The Dalhousie Law Journal

and autonomy. The characterization of privacy as "control over access" to
information presents special problems for many women directly targeted
in obscenity because it invites an investigation of consent. On many
accounts, adults featured in obscenity are taken to have consented both
to the acts recorded and to the creation and circulation of that record.
While some participants may in fact consent, the overall presumption of
consent may well be misplaced-particularly if one insists upon informed
consent, which implies the existence of available options, knowledge
of those options, and a conscious choice in favour of participation.3
Nevertheless, under a "control over access to information" theory, one
of the preliminary hurdles will be demonstrating the lack of consent to
waive privacy in relation to the activity depicted.
From this perspective, Allen and Gavison's limited or restricted
access accounts, grounded as they are in privacy being a condition of
inaccessibility of the person, would not appear to present such a roadblock.
An adult featured in obscenity could advance a claim to a privacy violation
merely on the basis that they were subjected to the "senses or surveillance
devices of others."32 As noted in the companion paper to this one, the
Supreme Court of Canada was prepared to acknowledge that those
depicted in obscenity might be consenting or appear to be consenting
to the acts in question, but that this was not determinative in terms of
whether the content itself constituted obscenity.33 Even so, given the
Canadian experience in relation to the CriminalCode provisions on sexual
history and counselling records,34 it is difficult to believe in the context of
the current privacy paradigm that a court is likely to be convinced that
a legally relevant privacy violation has occurred purely on the basis of
access to the adult featured in the materials where there is any suggestion
that he or she consented to both the conduct and its recording.35
Where individuals are the non-consensual direct targets of hate
propaganda, child pornography, or obscenity they could assert that the
31. Christopher Kendall, "Gay Male Pornography and Sexual Violence: A Sex Equality Perspective
on Gay Male Rape and Partner Abuse" (2004) 49 McGill L. 877 at paras. 9, 40, 59 and generally,
Christopher Kendall, Gay Male Pornography: An Issue of Sex Discrimination (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2004) [Kendall]. See also Catharine MacKinnon, "Pornography as Trafficking" (2005) 26 Mich.
J. Int'l. L. 993 at 995.
32. Allen, 1988, supra note 17 at 15.
33. R. v. Butler, [ 1992] I S.C.R. 452 at para. 49 [Butler].
34. These are discussed in detail in Part 2 below.
35. An account that would presume against consent might well be argued to risk infantalization
of women by implicitly suggesting that even informed and engaged consent is legally irrelevant in
determining whether the target's privacy rights have been violated. The restricted access account,
however, does not necessarily suggest whether consent should be presumed or not. It simply makes it
irrelevant.
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"expression" itself infringes their privacy within the confines of the current
individualistic paradigm-perhaps more successfully under a restricted
access account than on one focusing on control over information. Like
the claims advanced and accepted in the chiid pornography context,
individual targets of hate and obscenity could advance arguments about
intrusions on their "rights to be let alone," including their interests in
autonomy, anonymity, and seclusion. These forms of expression, it could
be argued, undermine the values privacy is designed to serve, either by
undermining the individual targets' ability to control access to information
about them or, in any event, by interfering with their ability to limit access
to themselves. They might even be argued, in some cases, to interfere
with the individual's ability to form relationships because of the rush to
judgment that might occur as a result of their being individually targeted.
In the contexts of hate propaganda and obscenity, however, where adults
are involved, overcoming presumptions about consent may prove difficult,
making "control over access to information" models such as Westin's
generally difficult to manoeuvre, unless courts can be convinced to
interrogate individual contexts further in order to determine whether truly
informed consent has been given.
Even though such claims are possible within the current individualistic
privacy paradigm, the fact is that in the contexts of hate propaganda and
obscenity, they do not appear to be being advanced and certainly show no
signs of being invited or endorsed by Canadian decision-makers. From
an equality perspective, I would suggest that this is for the best. In a legal
context such as ours, where what was once a fairly advanced conception of
substantive equality is already under seige,3 6 there would appear to be very
little to gain by advancing privacy claims steeped in the very individualism
that has for centuries shielded domestic violence from public inquiry
and permitted the blaming of disadvantaged individuals as victims of
their own unfortunate "choices." Indeed, the pitfalls for equality-seeking
communities and their members associated with such claims have been
made evident in the contexts of abortion and non-"modesty" based privacy
claims by women, and even more amply demonstrated in the context of
statutorily imposed directives relating to disclosure in sexual assault
cases that mandate Canadian courts to consider privacy and substantive
equality.

36. Sheila McIntyre, "Deference and Dominance: Equality Without Dominance" in Sheila McIntyre
& Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006), 95-114 [McIntyre & Rodgers].
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II. Pitfalls of the individualisticparadigmfor equality-seekinggroups
Privacy-based arguments have been strongly critiqued as inconsistent with
the objectives of equality-seeking groups and their members from across
a spectrum of feminist perspectives. This part explores three of these in
an effort to highlight some of the key pitfalls associated with privacybased arguments, together with practical examples of the ways in which
these pitfalls have actually surfaced in the context of attempts by equalityseeking groups to rely upon legal privacy arguments to advance their
interests. These critiques will then be relied on as a basis for informing the
discussion in Part III of the potential for building an equality-enhancing
conception of privacy.
Writing in the context of the right to abortion in 1989, Catharine
MacKinnon stated:
The liberal ideal of the private holds that, so long as the public does
not interfere, autonomous individuals will interact freely and equally.
Privacy is the ultimate value of the negative state. Conceptually, this
private is hermetic. It means that which is inaccessible to, unaccountable
to, unconstructed by anything beyond itself. By definition, it is not part
of or conditioned by anything systematic lies outside of it. It is personal,
intimate, autonomous, particular, individual, the original source and final
outpost of the self, gender neutral. ... To complain in public of inequality
within the private contradicts the liberal definition of the private. In
the liberal view, no act of the state contributes to shaping its internal
alignments or distributing its internal forces, so no act of the state should
participate in changing it.

This epistemic problem explains why privacy doctrine is most at home at
home, the place women experience the most force, in the family, and why
it centers on sex. ... For women the measure of the intimacy has been
the measure of the oppression. This is why feminism has had to explode
the private. This is why feminism has seen the personal as political. The
private is public for those whom the personal is political. In this sense,
for women there is no private, either normatively or empirically.

Freedom from public intervention coexists uneasily with any right that
requires social preconditions to be meaningfully delivered. For example,
if inequality is socially pervasive and enforced, equality will require
intervention, not abdication, to be meaningful. But the right to privacy is
not thought to require social change. It is not even thought to require any
social preconditions, other than nonintervention by the public.37
37. Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989) at 190-93 [MacKinnon].
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This passage encapsulates three difficult and persistent critiques of the
current western privacy paradigm that surface time and again in the case law
relating to hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography: (a) privacy
as an individualistic and atomistic right to control access to one's self, (b)
privacy as a negative right, and (c) privacy as inalterably gendered and
raced. If privacy is to be even a remotely effective legal tool for equalityseeking groups (and conversely not be used as a tool for continuation and
exacerbation of privately-effected inequalities) either we would have to
achieve equality before attempting to engage privacy, or privacy .would
have to be reconceptualized to take account of systematically generated
inequalities that go unnoticed under the current conception. In the latter
case, as will be discussed in Part III, social or collective accounts of
privacy might prove useful.
1. Privacy as an individualisticand atomistic right to control access
An account of privacy premised primarily upon the liberal vision of
promoting each individual's ability to control access to both their physical
and psychological selves does not appear on its face to undermine
promotion of equality where equality is conceptualized in terms of
promoting and protecting the rights and interests of each individual
member of an equality-seeking group. However, it can severely undermine
efforts to understand inequality as a systemically reinforced social ill.
Since traditional privacy analysis focuses on the particular situation of
the particular individual claiming its protections, attention is all too often
and too easily diverted from the discriminatory social context leading to
that situation, and from the ramifications of the particular conception of
privacy for the broader equality-seeking community. The risks to equality
posed by the prevalence of this atomistic legal conception of privacy have
been made evident in the context of judicial interpretation and application
of the Criminal Code38 provisions that place limits on the introduction of
evidence of complainants' sexual history and counselling records in the
39
context of criminal sexual assault trials.
In the late 1990s, members of the Canadian feminist legal
community sought and achieved legislative amendments that required
judges considering the admissibility of sexual history and counselling
records to take into account both the privacy and equality implications
of production-to contextualize the privacy interest at play within the
38. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. [Code].
39. For a more complete analysis, see: Lise Gotell, "When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault
Complainants, Sexual History Evidence and the Disclosure of Personal Records" (2006) 43 Alta.
L.Rev. 743 [Gotell].
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broader context of equality. In submissions to the Standing Committee
on Justice and Legal Affairs in relation to one of the Code amendments,
Sheila McIntyre asserted:
Almost everyone understands that the compelled disclosure of the
kinds of records being sought in these proceedings is an invasion of
privacy. That's not the hard part. Everybody understands that privacy is
a constitutionally protected interest, and most people understand that the
harm of such an invasion is particularly serious in the context of legal
proceedings that are intended to redress another invasion: a more deeply
personal, psychic, emotional and physical invasion like that of sexual
offences. There's a double invasion in this sequence.
The massive invasion of privacy rights in sexual offence proceedings
does require parliamentary redress, but this legally distinctive privacy
violation is, at its core, a product, reflection and vehicle of reproducing
inequality. It's actually an equality issue. Lack ofprivacy is amanifestation
of survivors' inequality in a society, and it's a compounding way of
driving home their inequality in the eyes of the law.n0
One central hope underlying the legislative reform was to drive home
an inexorable link between privacy and equality-that predominantly
women complainants were being asked to produce highly personal and
confidential records and to publicly expose their sexual histories precisely
because of false and discriminatory assumptions about what it means for
a woman to have undergone counselling and to have previously engaged
in consensual sexual activity. These assumptions included that those who
seek counselling are necessarily less stable and reliable, that they are
likely to have conjured up their accusations in counselling and that, if
they had said "yes" before (to anyone), they probably said "yes" to the
accused as well.4' Not only were these unequal assumptions feeding the
request for this kind of information, the information retrieved would then
be used to feed further false assumptions that, if adopted by the court
(whether consciously or sub-consciously), could result in an acquittal of an
otherwise guilty man. Finally, reliance on these kinds of assumptions and
exposure of otherwise highly personal and private information would feed

40. Sheila McIntyre, "Submissions to Standing Committee. Justice and Legal Affairs Regarding Bill
C-46, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (production of records in sexual offence proceedings)" (6
March 1997), online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/jula/
evidence/106_97-03 -06/j ula 106_blk 101 .html>.
41. These discriminatory assumptions were recognized by the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada as "rape myths": R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 at paras. 23, 91 and R. v. Shearing,
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 33 at paras. 76-77, 79, 108.
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broader inequality by discouraging survivors from seeking counselling
and, certainly, by discouraging survivors from reporting a sexual assault to
42
the authorities out of fear of triggering this kind of invasion.
Notwithstanding the explicit language in the amendments, Lise
Gotell's review of the case law arising from the relevant provisions
revealed a persistently atomistic and individualistic assessment of the
privacy interests of each particular complainant in each particular case,
with little direct regard for equality considerations or the broader collective
effect of production orders. Gotell placed the reversion to the atomistic
individualistic conception of privacy in the face of clear statutory language
to the contrary within the context of a broader neo-liberal agenda to reprivatize, individualize and depoliticize the highly-gendered reality of
sexual violence:
The emptiness of privacy, its nothingness and negativity, when relied
upon by courts to express concerns of sexual assault complainants,
very often means that their needs will be subordinated to the rights
of accused, viewed within the traditional framework of criminal law
as more compelling and significant. Privatization, the shielding of
intimate relations from legal regulation, continues to inhibit social and
legal recognition of sexual violence as a serious social problem. And
re-privatization within an era of neo-liberal governance has increasing
transformed sexual violence from an object of political contestation into
individualized and depoliticized
an issue of criminal law, privatized,
43
through this transformation.

In the context of the interpretation of these Code amendments, we get a
glimpse of the way in which the historic legacy of an atomistic conception
of privacy risks continuation of an analysis that pits individual against
individual in a competition that reinforces the notion we are dealing with a
completely individualistic and "private" realm, while ignoring the political
realities which shape that realm, the imbalance of'powerbetween individuals
within it and the legitimate public interest in intervening in an attempt
to right the balance. As this example demonstrates, each assertion of a
privacy claim risks becoming a platform for reinscribing an individualistic
and atomistic account of privacy, thereby re-privatizing a prevalent social
problem disparately disadvantaging members of particular social groups.
The risks of re-privatization are perhaps even more significant when one
reflects upon the prevalence of the legal conception of privacy as a negative
right against the state within Canadian case law.

42.
43.

Gotell, supra note 39 at paras. 42, 55.
Ibid. at para. 15.
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2. Privacy as a negative right against the state
Where privacy is conceptualized as an individual's right against state
interference in his or her "private" life, analyses of privacy claims will
tend to be characterized by a relatively myopic focus on the threat to liberty
and autonomy represented by the state-leaving intact and unspoken the
well-known threats to liberty and autonomy presented by private actors. 4
Without taking into account the privately-imposed component of restraints
on liberty and autonomy, such as systemic discrimination and prejudice,
these analyses are likely either to ignore the potential for state intervention
as a tool for effecting liberty or to display outright hostility at the very
suggestion. For those, such as the targets of hate propaganda, obscenity,
and child pornography, who wish to assert the potentially positive role
state regulation can play in the protection and development of their
autonomy, freedom, and dignity, framing a privacy-based argument may be
particularly problematic. Even if an equality-informed privacy argument
is advanced, decades of engrained legal thinking of privacy as a negative
right against state action may result in such arguments being skirted or
ignored. The legal recognition of privacy-related rights to abortion provides
a graphic example of the potential long-term inadequacies of advancing
privacy claims on behalf of equality-seeking communities-graphically
highlighting the somewhat pyrrhic victory associated with recognition of
the empty right to be "free" from the state.
As Sanda Rodgers has pointed out,
For women in Canada, in theory at least, the determination to continue
or to terminate a pregnancy is a right protected by sections 2 and 7 of
the Charter. In fact, the cases that considered women's control over
continuation of a pregnancy are arguably amongst our greatest legal
victories, providing legal protections that enhance women's equality.
Despite these victories, many feminist scholars rightly have been sharply
critical of the rights-based, neo-liberal, privatized argumentation that
characterizes Supreme Court jurisprudence on reproductive autonomy.

have had
More worrisome still is the limited impact that these decisions
45
on actual access to abortion for many Canadian women.
While the Supreme Court of Canada struck down criminal prohibitions
on abortion, relying on an analysis that these restrictions unreasonably

44. Mill, supra note 4 at 9-11.
45. Sanda Rodgers, "Misconceptions: Equality and Reproductive Autonomy in the Supreme Court
of Canada" in McIntyre & Rodgers, supra note 36 at 275-76.

Towards an Equality-Enhancing Conception
of Privacy

285

interfered with women's s. 7 rights, 4 the negative rights framework upon
which the analysis was based has ultimately limited its value to equalityseeking communities. In failing to speak to the need for the state to make
available the social support and medical facilities necessary for Canadian
women to have a real choice about whether to continue a pregnancy, the
privacy/autonomy victory has rung hollow as the number of publiclyfunded facilities providing access to abortion services continues to
shrink.4 7 As Gotell has noted in relation to privacy more generally,
"this negativity renders the claim to privacy an unwieldy instrument for
securing the provision of conditions that would enable meaningful control
and autonomy."48
3. Privacy as inalterablygenderedand raced
If individualism and a negative vision of the role of the state have
permeated legal analyses of privacy, so too have its gendered and raced
underpinnings, leading to the use of privacy claims as opportunities for
reinforcing the public/private divide and racist stereotypes that have served
as historic cornerstones for discrimination. Historically, as Anita Allen and
Erin Mack have pointed out:
In the nineteenth century, popular views concerning women's limited
capacities, proper role, and special virtues were reflected in legislation
and court opinions. The law of marriage and family contributed to the
problem of women's privacy within the home. That problem was too
much of the wrong kinds of privacy - too much modesty, seclusion,
reserve and compelled intimacy - and too little individual modes of
personal privacy and autonomous, private choice.
We must hope also that courts will turn self-consciously to the gender
factor in privacy tort cases. Early jurists sometimes did so, but with an
eye toward protecting their patriarchic visions of feminine modesty and
domesticity.49
46. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. While a majority concurred in the finding of
unconstitutionality, there was significant division in the reasons. While the reasons of Dickson C.J.
and Lamer J., and those of Beetz and Estey JJ. focused on security of the person, and in the latter set of
reasons, mainly on the procedural fairness of the Code provision in issue, only the reasons of Wilson
J. adverted specifically to the provision's interference with women's liberty of choice in the context of
private matters.
47. Sanda Rodgers, "Abortion Denied: Bearing the Limits of Law" in Colleen M. Flood, ed., Just
Medicare: What sIn, What's Out, How We Decide(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) c. 5.
A similar phenomenon has been noted in the United States, see: NARAL (National Association for
the Repeal of Abortion Laws), "Who Decides?", online: <http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/choiceaction-center/injyour state/who-decides/state-profiles/califpmia.html>.
48. Gotell, supra note 39 at para. 15.
U. L. Rev. 441 at
49. Anita Allen & Erin Mack, "How Privacy Got Its Gender" (1990) 10 N. I11.
477-78.
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Where the account of privacy is gendered to emphasize the importance
of maintaining feminine "modesty," privacy simply becomes code for
protecting women and in many cases their male keepers from embarrassment
and humiliation associated with expressions of sexuality."
Privacy as a form of protection of modesty was a very white, middleclass protection. As Gotell wrote:
If historically, privacy for women was equated with the protection of
feminine modesty, it is also clearly apparent that privacy's femini-e
subject was white. ... [T]he very construction of a white feminin *
tied to sexual propriety was accomplished in opposition to the myths of
the sexually promiscuous black woman and hypersexual black man ...
[leaving black women] outside the realm ofprivacy's tenuous protections,
just as it rendered them vulnerable to sexual abuse and attack by white
men. Through a parallel, if distinct, logic, Aboriginal women in Canada
were rendered promiscuous and constructed as legitimate targets of
sexual violence as part of the colonizing project.5'
As demonstrated in Gotell's analysis of the case law relating to the Code
provisions on sexual history and counselling records, the gendered and
raced legacy of privacy continues to plague legal analysis of women's
privacy-related claims. The statutory language clearly demands that privacy
and equality be taken into consideration, including the ways in which
a production order might not only violate the privacy of the individual
complainant, but might serve to perpetuate discriminatory myths and
discourage future reporting. Despite this, Gotell identified several cases
in which the "embarrassment" of being cross-examined on one's sexual
history according to a scale of the sexual activity involved preoccupied
the legal analysis.52 The potential for privacy-related claims to be used as
a basis for reinscribing feminine modesty has prompted specific calls for
an understanding of the production of sexual history evidence as a wrong
against equality, rather than against privacy per se.53
Other feminist accounts of privacy and its equality-enhancing potential
focus on the notions of privacy and private as integral to shaming and
control. Hille Koskela has argued, for example, that agency and freedom
may well be better achieved through explicit rejection of "privacy" and the

50. See ibid. for examples where women's privacy was protected in order to minimize the shame and
humiliation of pregnancy outside of marriage and sexual violation of wives by persons other than their
husbands.
51. Gotell, supra note 39 at para. 8.
52. Ibid. at para 45.
53. Gotell, supranote 39 at para. 45, cited in Janine Benedet, "Legal Rights in the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2000: Seeing the Big Picture" (2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 97 at 107.
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regimes of order and shame associated with them than through assertion
of privacy claims:
By the regime of order, I mean the ways in which society regulates
individuals. Gathering knowledge is seen as a form of maintaining
control, a look equates with a "judgmental gaze".... By the regime of
shame I mean individuals' internalisation of control, in the Foucauldian
sense. The idea of having or doing something that cannot be shown. The
basic 'need' for privacy. The regime of shame keeps people meek and
obedient as efficiently as any control coming from outside. Rejecting
it, is unacceptable and immodest. Further, these controls coming from
outside and from inside are most effective when functioning together:
the combination of fear and shame ensures submissiveness..... The
liberation from shame and from the 'need' to hide leads to empowerment.
one
Conceptually, when you show 'everything' you become 'free': 5no
4
can capture' you any more, since there is nothing left to capture.
Given the risks to equality-seeking groups ofreinscribing an individualistic,
negative right steeped in a raced and gendered history that seems to have,
to date, been all but impossible to shed, is there any merit in attempting
to articulate a privacy-related claim for the targets of hate propaganda,
obscenity and child pornography? Should equality-seekihg groups even
attempt to take up a tool "long used to defend the killers of women"?55 I
want to explore whether privacy, if differently accounted for, might offer
both strategic and substantive advantages to equality-seeking groups and
their members that equality alone does not. Any hope for realizing these
potential advantages, however, hinges upon advancing an account of
privacy that is both intrinsically premised upon substantive equality and
instrumentally tied to producing it.
Strategically, it is essential to recognize that regardless of whether
equality-seeking communities and their members actually advance privacy
claims on their own behalf, privacy claims that directly affect them are
being and will continue to be advanced. Unless we begin to encourage
Canadian courts to think otherwise, many of those claims will be assessed
in criminal contexts where the very individualism of the current paradigm
is valorized further through representations of the David and Goliath battle
between the state and the individual. Occasionally within this context,
substantive equality may be called upon as a justification for violating

54. Hille Koskela, "Webcams, TV Shows and Mobile Phones: Empowering Exhibitionism" online:
(2004) 2 Surveillance & Society 199 at 207-08 <http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/cciv.htm>.
55. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Is Privacy Bad for Women?" Boston Review (April/May 2000), online:
Boston Review <http://bostonreview.net/BR25.2/nussbaum.html>.
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that individualistic norm, reinforcing the idea that privacy necessarily
competes with substantive equality.
Substantively, it seems difficult to deny the personal and social
goods that can arise for members of equality-seeking groups from
having the meaningful choice to seek respite from pressures of social
conformity, spheres within which one can reflect upon the world and
one's relationship to it, and times where one can retreat from the scrutiny
of the world-particularly for those easily scrutinized for "otherness"
in settings dominated by white, colonialist, heterosexist, and patriarchal
paradigms.56 These, I would suggest, are the kinds of goods that are not
readily deliverable from substantive equality alone,57 although equality is
almost certainly a foundational ingredient in equitably distributed access
to and enjoyment of them.
Having admitted a predilection for the idea that members of equalityseeking groups ought to be able to enjoy some of the largely individual
goods that privacy might deliver, I suggest that this individualistic notion
of privacy need not occupy the entire account of privacy. As discussed in
the preceding parts of this section, that particular account has been shown
to be insufficient in the context of many attempts to assert privacy claims on
behalf of equality-seeking groups. Moreover, from a political perspective,
claims advanced on equality grounds are claims by individuals qua group
members or on behalf of the interests of groups themselves. Claims
about the harms of child pornography, hate propaganda, and obscenity
are inextricably tied to groups and group membership. Squeezing them
into the current individualistic privacy paradigm tends to de-politicize
them, to re-characterize the problem as being between individuals or one
individual and the state, rather than as part of a system that stereotypes
others and singles out for disrespect and abuse whole groups of persons
based on characteristics such as race, gender and sexual identity, thereby
compromising fundamental aspects of the personhood of many individuals.
In the context of hate propaganda, child pornography, and obscenity, while
the individualistically based conception of privacy would suggest an
interest by members of equality-seeking communities in avoiding, being
56. As Allen put it in relation to women, "[w]omen's abilities to participate and contribute in the
world as equals and on par with their capacities are limited where laws and customs deprive them of
[O]pportunities for privacy and the exercise
opportunities for individual forms of personal privacy ...
of privacy promoting liberties [can] promote female well-being, self-determination, participation and
contribution": Allen, 2003, supranote 7 at 53.
57. One might validly argue, however, that in a world characterized by a lived substantive equality,
freedom from scrutiny and pressures to conform to a white, straight, patriarchal standard would be
unnecessary. In that regard, privacy might turn out to be something of a stopgap measure for members
of equality-seeking groups.
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recognized as members of a group, perhaps a more collective account
would lead us toward an understanding of the ways in which recognized
group membership can be an affirming, rather than constraining, aspect of
an individual's humanity.
What would an equality-enhancing conception .of privacy look like?
To my mind, Priscilla Regan's social account of privacy, taken together
with commentary by Oscar Gandy and Julie Cohen on the collective
implications of digital data collection, could prove to be a useful .starting
point.
III. Towards an equality-enhancingconception ofprivacy
Rather than the simple assertion of privacy claims on behalf of individuals
directly targeted by child pornography, hate propaganda, and obscenity,
I envision a social account of privacy as one which would allow claims
to be made by the members of groups indirectly targeted by these forms
of "expression." Working from a social account of privacy might allow
us the opportunity to get clearer on the implications of discriminatory
stereotyping and conduct for equality-seeking groups, their members, and
the community at large.
Interestingly, it seems to have taken the technological threat to the
privacy of mainstream North Americans to generate the beginnings of a
truly social or collective account of privacy. Surveillance and a concomitant
lack of privacy have been a fact of life for many equality-seeking groups
and their members for some time, yet the push for a more collective account
of privacy emanates primarily from concerns raised by more privileged
masses of digital data creators and users who are feeling the threat of
invidious distinctions premised on impersonal and de-contextualized
analyses of data relating to them. Despite what might be viewed as the
less-than-radical roots of the relatively recent push for a more social or
collective account of privacy, the analyses of Regan and Cohen, and in
particular the more critical perspective offered by Gandy with respect to
digital data collection, analysis, and social sorting, shed important light on
key aspects of a more social account of privacy that could prove useful in
understanding and articulating the collective privacy-related harms of hate
propaganda, child pornography, and obscenity.
1. Collective perspectives on privacy--Gandy,Regan and Cohen
Oscar Gandy has offered a socially contextualized account of privacy
and surveillance. His account brings some clarity to the group-based
discriminatory effects of decision-making premised on the sorting of
individuals into classifications through analysis of aggregated individual
data.
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The panoptic sort is the name I have assigned to the complex technology
that involves the collection, processing, and sharing of information about
individuals and groups that is generated through their daily lives ... and
is used to coordinate and control their access to the goods and services
that define life in the modem capitalist economy. 8
Gandy went on to argue that the sort functioned through identification
(only in relation to those characteristics or issues that have administrative
and instrumental relevance), classification (the assignment of individuals
to conceptual groups), and assessment (comparing the individual to some
administratively identified aggregate). 9 He has noted, however, the
degree to which these identifiers and the ways in which they are assessed
come to be internalized in the identity of those targeted and to affect their
perceptions and understandings of the groups to which they belong:
It is important to note that individual identities are formed in interaction
with others. The characteristics of those interactions help to determine
the salience, as well as the level of comfort with which different aspects
of one's identity co-exist. Self-esteem or how an individual feels about
herself is determined, in part, by the ways in which her relevant reference
groups are evaluated by others.6"
Gandy further argued that the negative effects of the panoptic sort are
exacerbated by the uni-dimensional data upon which assessments are
based. Given that decisions are premised on incomplete and unreliable
data that have often initially been collected for other purposes, there is a
very serious risk that individuals and groups will be falsely evaluated. 6' He
predicted the results in the context of the corporate/consumer relationship
would be devastating for those who are already socially disadvantaged:62
I see the panoptic sort as a kind of high-tech cybernetic triage through
which individuals and groups of people are being sorted according to
their presumed economic and political value. The poor, especially poor
people of color, are increasingly being treated as broken material or
58. Oscar H. Gandy Jr., The Panoptic Sort: A PoliticalEconomy of PersonalInformation (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1993) at 15 [Gandy, 1993].
59. Ibid. at 15-17.
60. Oscar H. Gandy Jr., "Exploring Identity and Identification in Cyberspace" (7 June 2000), online:
Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania <http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/
ogandy/ldentity.pdf>' at 4 [Gandy, 2000].
61. Ibid. at 12.
62. Curiously, in later work Gandy speculated that it was unclear whether the panoptic sort would
ultimately result in an uneven distribution of privacy along current axes of identity and discrimination
such as race and gender: Gandy, 2000, supra note 60. The idea may be that, if it is the most empowered
members of society who enjoy access to the online environment then it is the privacy of the most
empowered that is at stake in the debates surrounding digital data collection and surveillance: Bennett
& Raab, supra note 26 at 33-34.
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damaged goods to be discarded or sold at bargain prices to scavengers
in the marketplace.63
Like Gandy's panoptic sort, Regan's account of the social dimension
of privacy appears to have developed in response to concerns about the
impact of digital data collection and analysis. It was in the context of
what she saw as disappointing legislative responses to these concerns that
Regan explicitly asserted that privacy can and should be regarded as a
social value:
Privacy has a value beyond its usefulness in helping the individual.
maintain his or her dignity or develop personal relationships. Most
privacy scholars emphasize that the individual is better off if privacy
exists; I argue that society is better off as well when privacy exists. I
maintain that privacy serves notjust individual interests but also common,
public and collective purposes. If privacy became less important to one
individual in one particular context, or even to several individuals in
several contexts, it would still be important as a value because it serves
other crucial functions beyond those that it performs for a particular
individual. Even if the individual interests in privacy became less
compelling, social interests in privacy might remain.'
Privacy, Regan argued, is a common value in that the social consequences
of privacy-related conduct extend beyond the individual and individuals
as an aggregate. She noted that privacy's contributions to diversity,
tolerance, and pluralism were contributions to society as a whole.65 She
maintained that the common value in privacy was being made apparent in
the context of digital information gathering and use by large institutions,
which premise decisions about individuals on analyses of isolated data
points taken and used outside of their context, without reciprocity in terms
of the data subject's ability to do likewise.
[I]n the late twentieth century, parts of every individual's life are
recorded in a number of computerized databases and exchanged with
other organizations. Access to these bits of information gives, at best,
a fragmented picture of an individual; the individual is not seen in a
social context, no reciprocity exists, and no common perceptions are
recognized.66

63. Gandy, 1993, supra note 58 at 1-2.
64. Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values and Public Policy (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995) at 221.
65. Ibid. at 222-23. Regan referred to a conception of society that extends beyond the sum of
individuals within it-to a potentially more organic conception that moves beyond emphases on the
atomistic, isolated individual: Ibid. at 220.

66.

Ibid. at 223-24.
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Privacy is a public value, she argued, because it works to support the
democratic process-in the Emersonian sense ofbetter enabling individuals
to live up to their social responsibilities and to more meaningfully participate
in public processes. Regan theorized that better social participation was
possible where individuals are able to occasionally separate from collective
pressures to conform.
A public value of privacy, then, is derived from its importance to the
exercise of rights that are regarded as essential to democracy, such as
freedom of speech and association, and from its importance as a restraint
on the arbitrary power of government. But does privacy itself have
independent value to the political system? ...Does privacy provide
something important in and of itself?67
In response to questions about the intrinsic public value of privacy, Regan
turned to Hannah Arendt's conclusion that privacy was necessary in order
for commonality to exist in the public realm. This analysis suggested
that some degree of non-disclosure is essential in order for people to find
common ground within the public realm without being consistently driven
apart by having too much knowledge of one another's differences.68 This
is an aspect of Regan's account that I would suggest is unlikely to be
helpful to equality-seeking groups in the long-term. Rather than an account
of privacy that valorizes it as a vehicle for social peace by concealing
differences, it seems preferable to work toward an account of privacy
steeped in an aspiration for equality and respect for integral aspects of
identity that have been socially constructed as "differences" used to justify
invidious discrimination.69
Finally, Regan posited that privacy is a collective good in the sense
that it is indivisible and non-excludable because "no one member of
society can enjoy the benefit of [it] without others also benefiting."7 In the
context of digital data collection processes, she noted the inefficacy of the
current individualistic approach to privacy and these processes' potential
effect on the common good. Where third-party record holders have strong
incentives to collect, sell and re-distribute data and the data subjects have
67. Ibid. at 226.
68. Ibid. at 226-27.
69. As Gavison has pointed out, concealment may well be an important function of privacy for
members of equality-seeking communities for whom exposure may result in severe physical,
psychological and emotional injury: Gavison, supra note 19 at 452. Nonetheless, privacy through
concealment in that context is a "choice" coerced through discrimination. While privacy in those cases
may provide individual protection, it seems to me that conceiving of concealment of differences so
fundamental to one's personhood and humanity as a central function of privacy is likely in the long
run to simply perpetuate the very inequality that compels concealment in the first place.
70. Regan, supra note 64 at 227.
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insufficient understanding of their rights and options in relation to data
retention and use (and where disclosure is becoming increasingly essential
to simply operate in the modern world) Regan predicted a "tragedy of
the commons." Even leaving aside the prospect that individuals are not
in any meaningful sense voluntarily forgoing or restricting access to and
use of information about themselves, these individual choices can have
profound effects on the privacy available to all, as well as on other aspects
of common social life. As an example, she suggested that if many people
opted out of health care out of concern for the lack of privacy in their
health records, this could have profound effects on the health care system
and on public health.7'
As personal information continues to become a more and more valuable
commodity with increasingly obvious effects on the collective good at large,
Regan's argument underscores the importance of re-characterizing privacy
as something more than an individual right. Moreover, she noted the way
in which this recharacterization could assist in public policy debates with
respect to legislative reform by minimizing the individual right vs. societal
right dichotomy that currently underpins privacy vs. security debates, and
would also make evident the serious societal downsides to treatment of
privacy as properly susceptible to individual "choice":
If privacy is, or is becoming, a collective or public good, the weaknesses
of policy solutions that establish a property right in personal information
or that allow one to waive one's privacy rights also would become clear.
If one individual or a group of individuals waives privacy rights, the
level of privacy for all individuals decreases because the value of privacy
decreases.72
If privacy is to be re-characterized as more than an individual right in
order to strengthen it in perceived competitions with other social values,
such as security, the same re-characterization is likely to be used in
balancing privacy with equality. As will be discussed in section 2 below,
this is an important strategic reason to suggest a social account of privacy
that incorporates equality as one of privacy's instrumentalities. If we can
accept that we should approach privacy as conducive to liberty, why not
to equality too?
In order to advance the policy debate in favour of privacy, Regan
called for a significant shift in approach:
[M]ost authors turn privacy inward and develop its importance

71.
72.

Ibid. at 228-29.
Ibid. at 233.
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to individual self-development and the establishment of human
relationships. Our thinking on privacy now needs to turn outward, to its
importance to social, political, and economic relationships - rather than
solely to personal relationships - and to our common or public life more
generally.7"

Julie Cohen, in responding to Jeffrey Rosen's Unwanted Gaze,74 also
took aim at the sufficiency of proposed individualistic responses to
privacy invasions. She argued that the same individualistic liberalism
that underlies the current privacy paradigm was also responsible for the
vast accumulation and use of digitized information gathering and sorting
processes. Premised upon the liberal model of the rational thinker, she
suggested we have wrongly presumed that accumulation of more data
and data processing sophistication will generate better information, which
will in turn generate more truth.75 Like Gandy, Cohen argued that the
data that are gathered do not simply generate decisions about individuals
and the groups to which they belong (with lasting repercussions on their
dignity in many contexts), they also affect acts reflexively-feeding back
to the individual data object herself an image of who she is and what it is
acceptable to be. As Cohen put it:
We may think what we please, but we respond to the information that
we are shown and the ways that others treat us. Over time, this dynamic
constructs and modifies habits, preferences and beliefs.76
Like Regan, Cohen cast doubt on the prospect for protection of privacy
through notions like individual control over waiver, noting the thin
conceptions of consent that dominate common law legal analyses.7 7 From
this perspective, Cohen asserted that individualistic liberal conceptions of
privacy were unlikely to be productive in terms of responding to concerns
about privacy depletion resulting from judgments premised on the digitized
collection and sorting of data, stating:
Liberal ideology got us into this mess; it will not get us out. The
conversation must proceed in some other way."

73. Ibid. at 242.
74. Jeffrey Rosen, The UnwantedGaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (New York: Vintage
Books, 2001).
75. "The belief that more personal information always reveals more truth is ideology, not fact,
and must be recognized as such for informational privacy to have a chance": Julie Cohen, "Privacy,
Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen" online: (2001) 89 Geo. L. J. 2029 at 2036
Georgetown Law <http://www.law.georgetown. edu/faculty/jec/privacyideology.pdf' at 7-8.
76. Ibid. at 6.
77. Ibid. at 16.
78. Ibid. at 7.
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Where, then, might the approaches of Gandy, Regan, and Cohen take us
in terms of the central problem addressed in this paper-attempting to
articulate privacy interests of the individual and collective targets of hate
propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography?
2. Advancing collective privacy claims for targets of hate, obscenity,
and childpornography
(a) Identifying helpful strandsfrom Gandy, Regan, and Cohen
Several strands from the work of Regan, Gandy, and Cohen provide useful
instruction in articulating an equality-enhancing conception of privacy
that could work for targeted groups and their members. First, Regan's
work suggests the possibility of articulating privacy as instrumental in the
production of social goods and values, which ought to include equality.
Second, Gandy and Cohen's observations relating to privacy and identity
formation cast doubt on the predominating perception within the paradigm
that identities are formed "in private"-identifying the significance of
societal interaction and prejudice on individual autonomy with respect
to self-definition. Third, Regan and Cohen's articulation of the collective
dangers of conceptualizing privacy as something completely subject to
individual definition and waiver contributes to the possibility of a vision
of privacy less likely to be diverted by patriarchal assumptions about
consent, particularly in the context of obscenity. Fourth, Regan, Gandy,
and Cohen's analyses of the way in which mere collection of information
leads to the threat of decontextualized aggregation and discriminatory
comparisons provides a useful analogy for thinking through the way that
hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography work.
Regan, by arguing for a social account of the value of privacy, perhaps
takes us closest to that objective. Privacy, she said, should be understood
as a common value and a public value in that it can function to produce
democratic goods that extend beyond the individual members of a liberal
democracy.7 9 I would suggest, however, that an equality-enhancing
conception of privacy would go further to place a greater value on privacy
when it is a producer of another too-frequently unmentioned democratic
good: substantive equality. Conversely, privacy that is a producer of
substantive inequality ought to be understood as less democratically
valuable. Evaluating the role that privacy plays in terms of substantive
equality in any given circumstance will require analysis and understanding
of the context in which privacy is alleged to operate.

79.

Regan, supranote 64 at 213, 225.
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Gandy's and Cohen's observations about the relationship between
privacy and identity are integrally tied to recognition that privacy and
substantive equality are, indeed, related. Their work provides an important
platform from which to re-think the ways in which protection of one person's
privacy can lead to discrimination and denial of an essential function of
privacy to another. As they observed, individual autonomy over identity
is never complete, since we are all acted upon by and, to some degree,
internalize social cues about who we are and who it is safer/better/more
acceptable to be.8" In pointing out the porous nature of the relationship
between the self and society, their work provides important instruction on
one aspect of identity formation that has been under-analyzed in Canadian
case law.8 Rather than the current paradigmatic analysis that individuals
need a place to retreat in order to self-define apart from society, the work
of Cohen and Gandy demonstrates not only the ways in which information
is used to define mainstream perspectives on the meaning of "other"
identities, but also to highlight the way in which the imposition of socially
constructed identities through public treatment and observation comes to
be internalized in so-called private times of self-definition and reflection.
The approaches of Regan and Cohen to privacy and privacy violations
provide a sound basis from which to question the relevance of traditional
liberal solutions such as waiver and "consent" while minimizing the risk of
undermining individual agency. Once the approach to privacy is refrained
to extend the understanding of its value beyond the production of individual
goods, the question of whether any individual has waived or consented to
an intrusion upon his or her privacy ought to be considered less relevant in
many circumstances. Where conduct is understood to threaten the privacyrelated goods of whole groups and the community at large, any inquiry
about whether privacy has been violated certainly cannot begin and end
with an analysis of whether a directly targeted individual has consented to
participate in that conduct and/or to waive his or her privacy. His or her
purported waiver has a negative impact on the privacy of others, whose
interests must also be taken into account.
The analyses of Regan, Gandy, and Cohen of specific problematic
patterns in digital data collection and -use provide a useful framework

80. Cohen, supra note 75; Gandy, 2000, supra note 60 at 4-5.
81. The exceptions to this statement, of course, are several of the hate propaganda decisions in
which Canadian courts and decision-makers, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have explicitly
recognized the significant impact of external evaluations of the groups to which one belongs on one's
own self-definition and desire to identify and be identified with those groups: R. v Keegstra, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 697 at paras. 60-61 and Schnell v. Machianelli andAssociates Enpcize Inc. (2002), 43 V.H.R.R.
D/453 at paras. 78, 84.
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that more readily describes the basis for critique of social sorting through
comparison to aggregates of individual data. Much of this critique, and
the patterns made obvious as a result of it, provide a helpful framework
for efforts to capture the privacy-related wrongs occasioned by hate
propaganda, child pornography, and obscenity.
Regan and Gandy offered three specific critiques of contemporary
digital data collection and use and the social sorting premised upon it. First,
each noted the degree to which data collected in one set of circumstances
and for one purpose are used as the basis for social sorting in a completely
different context. 2 Second, and related to the' first; each identified the
way in which data were collected and used in fragments, rather than as a
whole.83 Finally, Regan emphasized the degree to which contemporary
systems of digital data collection and use were non-reciprocal in nature.84
The lack of reciprocity for those about whom information was gathered
and subsequently used undermined their ability to assert any degree of
control over the process itself.
The work of Regan, Gandy, and Cohen suggests that if we had
placed limits on the collection and dissemination of digital data in the
first instance, we might have been in a better position to control its use
and abuse.85 Instead, however, we confront a situation in which the risk
of false results is magnified by the decontextualized use of fragments of
information gathered in and for another set of circumstances, where there
is no reciprocity between the data collector and the data object. Judgments
about important aspects of individuals' social, commercial, and political
lives are therefore being rendered on a faulty basis, with significant
consequences for those individuals, the groups to which they belong, and
society as a whole. Moreover, these judgments become a way of feeding
back to the individuals so identified faulty messages about who they are,
who they ought to be, and what they can reasonably aspire to.
I suggest that hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography
operate in a similarly problematic fashion. These forms of "expression"
collect and disseminate decontextualized fragments and outright false
information about essential aspects of the humanity of target groups
and their members. The fragments are absorbed into social profiles that

82. Priscilla M. Regan, "Privacy as a Common Good in the Digital World", (2002) 5 Information
Communication to Society 382 at 392-93; Gandy, 1993, supra note 58 at 55.
83. Regan, supra note 64 at 223; Gandy, 2000, supra note 60 at 7-9. See also: Daniel J. Solove,
"Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy" 53 (2001) Stan. L.
Rev. 1393 at 1424-25.
84. Regan, ibid.
85. Regan, ibid. at 219-220; Gandy, 1993, supranote 58 at 18; Cohen, supra note 75 at 7-8.
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inform our behaviour toward and treatment of those "otherized" in the
process-those seen to fall outside of the norm, the average. Moreover,
as Gandy makes clear with respect to digital data, such decontextualized
and fragmented decision-making in which the "other" is created relative to
the "average" will almost always serve to disadvantage the already most
disadvantaged communities.86 Invidious distinctions will be felt not only
by individual members of those communitieg, but by those communities
as a whole, as the otherized grapple with the relevance of these judgments
and distinctions in working through their own processes of self-definition.
As Regan, Gandy, and Cohen have suggested in the context of digital data
collection, I suggest that it is likely to be more effective to impose limits
on the collection and dissemination of these decontextualized fragments
and misrepresentations rather than waiting to see whether we can impose
effective limits on their (ab)use. My proposed analogy to this framework,
however, is certain to meet with critique.
(b) Confronting the limits of the analogy
In 1980, Barbara Bryant argued that pornography violated all women's
privacy through degrading displays of what was purported to be female
sexuality.87 She argued that the dignity, autonomy, and liberty of choice
of all women were compromised and assaulted by the commercialized
packaging and display of women's bodies in pornography. Allen
fundamentally rejected that argument, which is not unlike the one I seek
to construct here, for reasons which I suspect would also be argued to
undermine the viability of my analogy of hate propaganda, obscenity, and
child pornography to Regan, Gandy and Cohen's approaches to digital
data collection and (ab)use. Allen rejected the assertion of a link between
the consumption of and exposure to pornography and interference with
women's privacy, liberty, and autonomy for two fundamental reasons.
First, she rejected the argument that when individual women encounter
pornography they so strongly identify with the women depicted in it that
they experience a sense of loss of privacy. She noted that not all women's
reactions were the same, making the phenomenon an individual one
not applicable across the category "woman."88 Second, she argued that
while sexual harassment and assault were, themselves, forms of privacy
invasion, the social science evidence vas insufficient to support a direct
link between consumption of porncgraphy znd the commission of the acts
86. Gandy, 1993, ibid. at 43.
87. Barbara Bryant, "Sexual Display of Women's Bodies-A Violation of Privacy" (1980) 10
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 1211.
88. Allen, 1988, supra note 17 at 140.
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of invasion.89 As it seems likely that criticism along both of these lines
would be advanced in relation to the the privacy claims I propose relating
to hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography, I will consider each
in detail.
The first argument is premised upon an individualized account of
privacy. Under this approach, whether a privacy violation occurs depends
upon the individual reactions of target group members to encounters with
hateful, obscene, and child pornographic materials. It might well be argued
that not all individuals encountering one of these forms of expression
claimed to target them and the groups to which they belong would
experience a sense of lost privacy or autonomy, ruling out the viability of
legislative responses premised on generalized assertions of lost privacy.
However, if one approaches privacy as a social value the focus of inquiry
would not be upon immediate individual responses9" or the aggregate of
those responses, but on the impact of these forms of expression on our
collective aspirations as a broader community. In this way we need not
discount lived privacy loss experiences by certain individuals simply
because others do not experience them as such. This may be particularly
important because many members of otherized groups in our communities
have little experience with "privacy"-particularly in terms of the absence
of social scrutiny in public. In those circumstances, it seems rather unlikely
that one would amass significant findings of individual perceptions of lost
privacy among those for whom an absence of privacy is the norm. It
seems reasonable to suggest that people are unlikely to report they have
lost something they have rarely, if ever, had.
A second line of argument would likely focus on the absence or (at
least) weakness of social science evidence supporting a connection between
consumption of hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography, and
conduct, such as hate crimes and sexual aggression, that interferes with a
target group member's ability to restrict access to his or her body. Here, it
might be argued that the analogy to Regan, Gandy, and Cohen's reasoning
breaks .down in that, in the case of digital data collection and use, there
is evidence to show that organizations are basing often discriminatory
decisions directly upon the data collected and disseminated. At best, it
might be argued, exposure to these kinds of material might lead people to
think about members of target groups in a certain way, but not necessarily

89. Ibid. at 139.
90. 1 would not wish to assert an account that forecloses the possibility of treating seriously an
individual target's experience of a privacy loss through encounters with these kinds of materials.
However, the account I am suggesting extends beyond consideration of those individual experiences.
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to act upon it in a way that materially interferes with target group
members' ability to restrict access to themselves. 91 Once they act upon
the information in a provably discriminatory way, other legal regulations
can be enforced to address that conduct. Before moving to some of the
specific social science evidence that suggests a correlation (albeit without
statistically establishing causation) between exposure to materials such as
hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography and the commission of
hate crimes and sexual offences, it seems important to point out some of
the political implications of calling for proof of causation. 92
There are documented instances in which the connection between
viewing and physical commission of specific acts has been made graphically
clear,93 but they are often dismissed as anecdotal and, therefore, insufficient
to establish the case for imposing restrictions on expression with any degree
of scientific certainty. Also often dismissed as anecdotal are the stories of
the lived realities told by the women and children used and abused in the
production of obscenity and child pornography, and those who describe
the ways in which their sexual abuse and assault were premised upon
mimicking acts depicted or described therein.94 In a similar fashion, studies
documenting the startlingly high percentages of men convicted of sexual
assault and abuse who also owned extensive collections of pornography
and child pornography are summarily dismissed.95
Adopting the position that one must establish a causal connection
between viewing materials and commission of specific acts referred to
therein implicitly involves marginalizing other accounts, such as the
91. 1have found only one account in which simply watching or thinking about another without their
authorization is characterized as a privacy violation. Ernest van den Haag argued that unauthorized
watching or formation in one's mind of the image of another violated the other's privacy by interfering
with her ability to assert control over her "psychic area, with such dimensions as living space, image,
expression, mentation and communication." He asserted, "[o]thers may be excluded from observing,
or utilizing, these dimensions, or from invading them with their own sounds, images, etc.; they many
not control our image, or our experience and comfort": Ernest van den Haag, "On Privacy" in R.
Pennock & J. Chapman, eds., NOMOS XIII: Privacy (New York: Atherton Press, 1971) 149 at 151.
92. Notably, the Supreme Court of Canada has not chosen proof of a causal connection between
word and specific deed as the standard that must be met to justify the imposition of restrictions on
hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography. Rather, the Court has required the government to
establish an evidentiary basis for a reasonable'apprehension of harm flowing from exposure to these
materials: Butler supra note 33 at para. 50, 103, 112. Sharpe, supra note 27 at paras. 198-210 and
Keegstra, supra note 81 at paras. 285-88.
93. In 2004 a Toronto man raped and murdered an I I year old after being "fuelled" by child
pornography online "Holly Jones - Timeline" (17 June 2004) Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/jones holly/>.
94. Janine Benedet, "Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Minister of Justice: Sex Equality and
the Attack on R. v. Butler" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 187.
95. Maxwell Taylor & Ethel Quayle, Child Pornography:An Internet Crime (New York: BrunnerRoutledge, 2003) at ix, 74-78 [Taylor & Quayle] and Benedet, ibid.
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accounts of those who do experience a loss of privacy whether directly or
indirectly targeted by the expression. Further, the imposition of this causal
standard reflects a choice to search for short-term evidence of physical
conduct when, as will be discussed below, the pathway to conduct is often
paved by lengthy periods of dehumanization of targets through textual
and pictorial indoctrination. Finally, where the causation analysis focuses
on proof of subsequent repetition of the particular conduct depicted, it
discounts the ways in which other kinds of pervasive discriminatory action
against target groups and their members are made easier through years
of dehumanizing representations. It also implicitly dismisses approaching
the expression as a discriminatory act in and of itself. I now turn to some
of the theoretical and social science accounts about how hate propaganda,
obscenity, and child pornography work to pave the way for violence,
discrimination, and inequitable interference with the autonomy of the
members of target groups.
In support of his assertion that racist words themselves wound, Richard
Delgado relied upon social science evidence that supported an immediate
connection between target group members' exposure to racial slurs and
emotional distress, loss of dignity, and psychological harm. He argued:
Verbal tags provide a convenient means of categorization so that
individuals may be treated as members of a class and assumed to share
all the negative attributes imputed to the class. ... Racial slurs also serve
to keep the victim compliant.

Social scientists who have studied the effects of racism have found
that speech that communicates low regard for an individual because of
race "tends to create in the victim those very traits of 'inferiority' that
it ascribes to him." Moreover, "even in the absence of more objective
forms of discrimination - poor schools, menial jobs and substandard
housing - traditional stereotypes about the low ability and apathy of
negroes and other ninorities can operate as self-fulfilling prophecies."96

96. Richard Delgado, "Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name
Calling" in M. Matsuda et al., eds., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech,
and the First Amendment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993) 89-110 at 94-95 [Matsuda et al.].
Here Delgado relied upon the findings of M. Deutsch, I. Katz & A. Jensen, Social Class, Race and
PsychologicalDevelopment (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1968) and Gordon Atlport, The
Nature of Prejudice (Reading, UK: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979). Notably, the Supreme
Court of Canada in Keegstra, supra note 81 at para. 88 recognized the risk of intrusion of hate
propaganda on the processes of self-definition of target group members, and the consequent risk this
posed for undermining equality and diversity.
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Other research suggests that racial slurs made against members of minority
groups can also have a profound effect on how members of in-groups
evaluate a minority group member's performance. Jeff Greenberg and
Tom Pyszczynski concluded:
Evaluations of individual minority group members can be biased by
overheard derogatory ethnic labels when the target's behaviour is less
than successful. In addition to the feelings of insult and degradation
that ethnic slurs instill in minority group targets, it appears that they
also encourage antiminority prejudice in in-group members who hear
them.97
Further, as Kimberle Crenshaw pointed out, depictions of sexual and
other kinds of violence against women frequently reinforce stereotypes
not only in relation to gender, but race as well. By analyzing examples of
stereotyped representations of women purveyed in mainstream media (i.e.,
without even having to move to the much smaller category of material
actually prohibited through legal restrictions on obscenity) she ably
demonstrated perpetuation of the myths of Black women as wild animals,
Asian-American women as passive and submissive, and Aboriginal women
as savages who enjoy being raped.9" She concluded:
In each of these cases, the specific image is created within the intersection
of race and gender. Although some claim that these images reflect certain
attitudes that make women of colour targets of sexual violence, the
actual effect of images on behaviour is still hotly contested. Whatever
the relationship between imagery and actions is, it seems clear that these
images do function to create counternarratives to the experiences of
women of colour that discredit our claims and render the violence that
we experience unimportant. 99
Building on the critical race scholarship of Delgado, Crenshaw, and others,
Alexander Tsesis carefully documents the link between hate propaganda
and active discrimination and atrocities against the Jews in Nazi Germany,
slaves in Mauritania, and Blacks and Aboriginals in the United States.' 0 In
order to respond to the asserted lack of proof of causal connection between
word and deed, Tsesis turned to historic examples.

97. Jeff Greenberg & Tom Pyszczynski, "The Effect of an Overheard Ethnic Slur on Evaluations of
the Target: How to Spread a Social Disease" (1985) 21 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 61
at 70.
98. Kimberle Crenshaw, "Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew" in
Matsuda et al., supra note 96, 111-32 at 119-20.
99. Ibid. at 120.
100. Alexander Tsesis, Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social
Movements (New York: New York University Press, 2002).
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Historic analysis is crucial because it exposes the association between
hate propaganda and discriminatory actions. Oppressors justify
inequities by making their targets out to be less than human, unworthy
of fair treatment or even for the mercy ordinarily shown to animals. Outgroups are portrayed as sexually depraved demons or unruly, childlike
savages and the victims themselves are blamed for their own problems
or destruction. Negative stereotypes and ideological schemas, designed
to rationalize power in the hands of dominant groups, precede crimes
against humanity such as genocide. Many lives may be ruined before the
views of those who rebuff popular prejudices trickle into the community
conscience. 0'
Having drawn a connection between word and deed, premised upon
historic examples, Tsesis then asserted the folly of an approach to hate
propaganda that limits the possibility of legislative intervention only to
those situations where harmful action is imminent. The road to intrusive
physical conduct may well be a lengthy one, 0 2 as representations are used
to inculcate a way of thinking about members of targeted groups that
rationalizes discriminatory treatment, 03 negatively affects target group
members' ability to self-define and undermines the interests of the entire
community in diversity, multiculturalism, and mutual respect. Numerous
studies have demonstrated the ways in which stereotypes come to inform
in-group interactions with members of out-groups, as well as the discourse
used within those interactions.0 4
Any causal connection between viewing child pornography and
subsequent commission of sexual offences against children has also proven
notoriously elusive to establish with scientific certainty.0 5 However,
in the context of representations that involve real children, a direct
violation of the dignity and privacy interests of those individuals is easily
established. The negative impact of the representations on the dignity and
101. Ibid. at 3.
102. The evidence of a direct link -between viewing hate propaganda and relatively immediate
commission of a, hate crime is heavily contested. See, for example: M. Sullaway "Psychological
Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws" (2004) 10:3 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & Law 250; Ervin Staub, "The
Origins and Evolution of Hate, With Notes on Prevention" in R. Sternberg, ed., The Psychology
of Hate (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2005) at 51; M.R. Banaji & R.
Bhaskar, "Implicit Stereotypes and Memory: The Bounded Rationality of Social Beliefs" in Memory,
Brain,and Belief D.L. Schacter & E. Scarry, eds. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2000)
at 139.
103. Supporting the contention that propaganda functions to distance in-groups from out-groups and
that this is an important first step in the development of hatred, see: R. Sternberg, "Understanding and
Combating Hate," in Sternberg, supra note 102 at 37.
104. Christine Mallinson & Zachary W. Brewster, "'Blacks and bubbas': Stereotypes, Ideology, and
Categorization Processes in Restaurant Servers' Discourse" (2005) 16 Discourse & Society 787.
105. Jane Bailey, "Confronting Collective Harm: Technology's Transformative Impact on Child
Pornography" (2007) 56 U.N.B.L.J. 65.
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privacy interests of children as a group and the collective interests of the
community at large are supported by some evidence. Those convicted of
sexual offences against children are also frequently involved in the child
pornography trade. °6 Use of child pornography is regularly an aspect of
sexual offences against children as perpetrators use the representations to
"normalize" the behaviour in the eyes of their victims.107 Recent studies
of online child pornography have revealed some evidence that exposure
to and involvement with this content in online communities can become
a way of normalizing sexual abuse of children and allowing participants
to convince themselves that children enjoy sexual abuse and are tradable
commodities for others' consumptive pleasure rather than human beings.'08
None of this establishes with any scientific certainty a causal connection
between viewing child pornography and sexually assaulting children. It
does, however, provide support for an understanding of child pornography
as a mechanism for interfering with perceptions about the dignity and
autonomy of the individual children abused in production and children
as a social group-both with significant implications for community
aspirations of equality.
As in the context of child pornography, whether there is sufficiently
established social science evidence to support a link between viewing
obscenity/pornography and subsequent commission of sexual offences is
hotly contested. In arguing that pornography'0 9 needed to be recognized as
a political practice that occasioned harm, rather than as a moral vice that
occasioned offence, MacKinnon asserted:
[P]ornography, with the rape and prostitution in which it participates,
institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the
eroticization of dominance and submission with the social construction of
male and female. Gender is sexual. Pornography constitutes the meaning
of that sexuality. Men treat women as whom they see women as being.
Pornography constructs who that is. Men's power over women means
that the way men see women defines who women can be. Pornography
is that way." 0

106. United States Postal Inspection Service, "Annual Report of Investigations" (2006), online:
United States Postal Service <http://www.usps.com/postalinspectors/ 06FY%20Pl%2OAnnual%20R
eport.pdf> at 36-38.
107. Sharpe, supra note 27 at para. 106 and Taylor & Quayle, supranote 95 at 75.
108. Taylor & Quayle, supra note 95 at 78.
109. MacKinnon specifically does not use the term "obscenity"--arguing it to be imbued with a legal
definition in which a moralistic patriarchal perspective is imposed to determine which pornography is
good (and therefore legal) and which pornography is "bad" and therefore illegal: MacKinnon, supra
note 37 at 196.
I10. Ibid. at 197.
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Here MacKinnon not only summarized her approach to the harms
of pornography, 'but also the need to understand the way in which
pornography interferes with intimate aspects of women's identities and
persons as intrinsically linked with the reality of the inequality in power
between men and women in society. While arguing strongly that the need
to establish some form of individuated physical harm resulting from
pornography constituted a fundamental misunderstanding of the way that
pornography works in an unequal society,"' MacKinnon pointed to then
emerging bodies of research suggesting a correlation between viewing
pornography and increased feelings of sexual aggression by men against
women, decreased likelihood of perceiving circumstances involving
rape as actually involving rape, and changes in men's attitudes toward
' 12
women, including "trivialization, dehumanization and objectification."
Christopher Kendall has made a similarly compelling argument about the
ways in which some gay male pornography serves to interfere both with
sex equality and equality on the basis of sexual identity by reinscribing
gendered and raced stereotypes of dominance and submission.' 3
The U.S. survey results reported on by Pamela Paul in 2005 revealed
some of the effects of the mainstrearning of heterosexual pornography and
habituation to increasingly extreme imagery.' "' Her work documented the
ways in which many women within heterosexual relationships understand
their expected sexual roles within those relationships as being increasingly
shaped and defined by pornography-both through a process of external
5
imposition and self-internalization."1

11l.MacKinnon asserted: "The trouble with this individuated, atomistic, linear, exclusive, isolated,
narrowly tortlike - in a word, positivistic - concepti6n of injury is that the way pornography targets
and defines women for abuse and discrimination does not work like this. It does hurt individuals, just
not as individuals in a one-at-a-time-sense, but as members of the group women. ... [P]ornography
dehumanizes women in a culturally specific and empirically descriptive - not liberal moral - sense.
In the same act, pornography dispossesses women of the same power in which it possesses men: the
power of sexual, hence gender, definition. The power to tell one who one is and the power to treat
one accordingly. Perhaps a human being, for gender purposes, is someone who controls the social
definition of sexuality": Ibid. at 208-09.
112. Ibid. at 304, note 6 to page 196, in which MacKinnon cites the work of, among others: N.
Malamuth & E. Donnerstein, eds., Pornography and Sexual Aggression (Orlando, FL: Academic
Press, 1984); D.Zillman, Connection between Sex andAggression(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1984). See
also: Patricia Greenfield, "Inadvertent Exposure to Pornography on the Internet" (2004) 24 Applied
Developmental Psychology 741; cf(for example) Winai Wongsurarat, "Pornography and Social Ills:
Evidence from the Early 1990s" online: (2006) 9:1 Journal of Applied Economics 185 <http://redalyc.
uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/1 03/103901 10.pdf>.
113. Kendall, supranote 31.
114. Pamela Paul, Pornified: How Pornographyis TransformingOur Lives, Our Relationships, and
Our Families (New York: Times Books, 2005).
115. Ibid. at 127-33.
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Even in the absence of any type of conclusive scientific evidence of
causation, I would suggest that there is a reasonable basis to apprehend that
hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography trigger interference
with the privacy-related interests of the groups they target. As MacKinnon
suggested in the context of pornography, these forms of "expression"
invidiously infect the social identities constructed around equality-seeking
groups, becoming purported mainstream truths about individuals on the
basis of their membership in those groups. Misrepresentative messaging
about equality-seeking groups then becomes a platform for the imposition
of identities on individual group members-both through external force
and discrimination and sometimes through the invidious process of
internalization by many group members themselves.
Conclusion
The Canadian case law on hate propaganda, obscenity, and child
pornography features numerous analyses and discussions of the right to
privacy, almost exclusively in the context of the privacy claims of those
accused of related offences. Shaped as they are by the contexts in which
they are raised, these analyses tend to mirror the negative, individualistic,
control-over-access-to-information paradigm that has dominated thinking
on the issue for several centuries. Notwithstanding that the vast bulk of
Canadian legal analysis focuses on the right of an individual accused
against state intrusion on a "private" sphere of activity to the exclusion of
consideration of the privacy-related rights of the targets of hate propaganda
and obscenity, Canadian courts have recognized that child pornography
intrudes upon the privacy-related interests of the individual children
abused in its production. The failure to recognize that hate propaganda
and obscenity trigger similar intrusions for the members of the groups
they target need not be understood to reflect that no such intrusions are in
fact triggered. I suggest that we ought to place that failed recognition in
the context of the selection of an individualistic privacy paradigm that, by
and large, is conceptually inadequate to capture the collective nature of the
privacy-related harms occasioned by these forms of "expression."
Some individuals targeted directly by hate propaganda and obscenity
could muster arguments to squee7', the related privacy intrusions they
experience as a result of that targeting into the individualistic paradigm,
as has been the case wit1' the analysis of the privacy-related intrusions
on the children abused in production of child pornography. In the case of
hate propaganda, however, the typical modus operandi of hate purveyors
avoids attacks on individuals, focusing on broad categories. In the case of
obscenity, the individualistic control-over-access paradigm, combined with
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patriarchal presumptions that women should be assumed to have consented
to sexual activity and abuse, is likely to impose a preliminary threshold of
proof of non-waiver. Re-making what are essentially collectively-based
claims into individual claims for the purpose of fitting the paradigmatic
mould is unlikely, however, to form the basis of a meaningful long-term
strategy for equality-seeking groups and their members.
The analyses of privacy in the contexts of abortion and the counselling
records and sexual histories of complainants in sexual assault cases have
tended to re-personalize political issues, undermine calls for affirmative
state action, and reinscribe gendered and raced notions of privacy. Privacybased arguments by the direct targets of hate propaganda and obscenity
crafted to fit the paradigm may do the same. The privacy-related harms
of hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography need also to be
understood in the context of social inequalities that allow the empowered
to constrain the autonomy of otherized individuals by limiting their
opportunities for self-definition through presumptive social attribution
of characteristics to the equality-seeking groups with which individual
targets are identified. The personal intrusion is integrally and intrinsically
related to systemic, group-based power imbalances. Claims framed within
the individualistic privacy paradigm are more likely to bury that dynamic
than to make it understood. Without that recognition, the potential role for
state action to address those imbalances-or at least a call for state action
reflecting a conscious choice not to reinforce those imbalances-is likely
to be ignored.
Rather than trying to fit collectively-based harms into an individualistic
paradigm, I suggest a re-thinking of the individualistic paradigm in a way
-that better reflects collective considerations by articulating privacy's social
value. The seeds for this idea were originally sown within other aspects
of work by authors such as Westin, but were largely sidelined in the wake
of an individualistic drive against state intrusion. They have since been
replanted in the work of authors such as Allen and Gavison who have
advocated privacy as a producer of social goods such as better democratic
participants and contributors. However, the possibility of articulating
privacy as a social value stems first and foremost from the work of authors
.such as Gandy, Regan, and Cohen in the context of rising concern as to
the broad-ranging privacy implications of digital data collection and use.
As fragmented individual data collected for one purpose are aggregated
and re-used out of context as the basis for labelling and making judgments
affecting individuals' lives with very little opportunity for reciprocity on
their part, the adequacy of individualistic models that focus on control
over access to information has increasingly come under scrutiny.
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The push, in the context of digital data collection and use, for
recognition of privacy as a public value, a common value and a collective
value and the potentially invidious collective forms of discrimination to
which its inobservance can give way offers both threats and opportunities
for members of equality-seeking groups. To the extent that those accused
of offences relating to hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography
could then bootstrap their individualistic privacy argument with one
premised on societal interests, the competing equality-based interests of
the members of target groups may be undermined. On the other hand,
thinking collectively about the value of privacy opens up the opportunity
to better articulate a more group-based conception of the privacy violation
occasioned by perpetuation of group-based stereotypes prevalent in hate
propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography. It suggests an opening to
argue that privacy should not simply be conceived of as a producer of
individualistic goods such as free expression, freedom of conscience, and
liberty, but also the equally important but too frequently unmentioned
democratic right to substantive equality.
In this paper I have begun the project of attempting to sketch the
parameters of that collectively-based privacy argument. The project is
premised on accounts of authors such as Delgado, Crenshaw, Tsesis, and
MacKinnon on how hate propaganda, obscenity, and child pornography
work to impose social constructions of inhumanity on targeted groups that
are both externally reinforced and sometimes internalized in a way that
provides presumptive access to target group members and interferes with
their abilities to self-define. To the extent that these effects lead individuals
to choose to dissociate or to attempt dissociation from the groups so
targeted, both the groups themselves and society as a whole stand to lose;
our aspirations for diversity, plurality, and mutual respect and tolerance
are undermined.
If hate, obscenity, and child pornography are understood in this way,
certain aspects of the current push for a social conception of privacy within
the context of digital data collection can be usefully analogized. Simplistic
data derived from these forms of "expression" are used to render social
profiles of targeted groups that become a basis for imposed definitions
not only on those groups, but their members as well. These socially
constructed definitions then form the basis and purported justification
for discriminatory action and treatment of individual members of those
groups that are, in some cases, internalized within their own processes of
self-definition.
The fragments of identity misrepresented in hate propaganda, obscenity,
and child pornography are used to form the bases for social composites
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that intrude both upon the definition of self and the understanding of self
in relation to group. The social constructions produced authorize privacy
intrusions that both reflect and reinforce substantive inequality. For
equality-seeking communities, privacy understood entirely as a producer
of purely individualistic goods such as free expression and liberty is an
empty proposition. Privacy understood as a social value and producer of
collective goods such as substantive equality seems more like something
worth talking about.

